Cognitive bias in animal behavior science: A philosophical perspective by Nematipour, Behzad et al.
1 
 
Cognitive bias in animal behavior science: A philosophical perspective 1 
 2 




BN: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Münster, Domplatz 23, 48143 Münster, Germany 7 
MB: Department of Behavioural Biology, University of Münster, Badestr. 13, 48149 Münster, Germany 8 
UK: Department of Philosophy, University of Münster, Domplatz 23, 48143 Münster, Germany 9 
 10 
Correspondence 11 
Behzad Nematipour, behzad.nematipour@uni-muenster.de 12 
 13 
ORCiD 14 
BN: 0000-0003-0329-4107 15 
MB: 0000-0001-6528-3572 16 
UK: 0000-0002-5524-9626  17 
 18 
Abstract 19 
Emotional states of animals influence their cognitive processes as well as their behavior. 20 
Assessing emotional states is important for animal welfare science as well as for many fields 21 
of neuroscience, behavior science, and biomedicine. This can be done in different ways, e.g., 22 
through assessing animals’ physiological states or interpreting their behaviors. This paper 23 
focuses on the so-called cognitive judgment bias test, which has gained special attention in the 24 
last two decades and has become a highly important tool for measuring emotional states in 25 
non-human animals. However, less attention has been given to the epistemology of the 26 
cognitive judgment bias test and to disentangling the relevance of different steps in the 27 
underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper sheds some light on both the epistemology of 28 
the methods and the architecture of the underlying cognitive abilities of the tested animals. 29 
Based on this reconstruction, we propose a scheme for classifying and assessing different 30 
cognitive abilities involved in cognitive judgment bias tests. 31 
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 47 
1 Introduction 48 
Assessing animals’ emotional states has explanatory, predictive, and illustrative value for 49 
animal welfare science, neuroscience, and psychopharmacology (Mendl et al. 2009), as well 50 
as for the discourse concerning attributing rights to sentient species. However, this assessment 51 
is particularly difficult in non-human animals because of the lack of verbal interaction. That is 52 
why scientists in these fields are looking for various indicators of emotional states such as 53 
behavioral and physiological changes that accompany such states in order to assess in which 54 
emotional state an animal is, or whether or not animals of the considered species have them at 55 
all (Kremer et al. 2020). For example, the state of fear may be accompanied by behavior like 56 
freezing, fleeing, or even attacking, and by physiological changes such as increased heart rate, 57 
increased blood pressure, and enhanced levels of circulating glucocorticoids (Mendl et al. 58 
2009). In biomedical research, animal models for emotional disorders, such as anxiety and 59 
depression, are often based on exposing animals to stressful conditions and then recording 60 
behavioral indicators, e.g., immobility, exploration versus avoidance, self-grooming, and 61 
vocalizations (see Bourin 2015; Kalueff et al. 2016; Simola and Granon 2019; Wang et al. 62 
2017). Animal research in general uses emotional indicators mostly to detect negative 63 
emotional states (Proctor et al. 2013) and the methods for assessing positive states are limited 64 
(Paul et al. 2005). This limits the research of emotions in non-human animals, particularly 65 
from the perspective of animal welfare because of the aspiration to induce positive states, in 66 
addition to reducing pain and suffering, in animals (Boissy et al. 2007). Additionally, many 67 
commonly used indicators suffer from certain epistemic problems (which are discussed in 68 
3 
 
detail in the next section). This motivates scientists to consider novel indicators that are 69 
potentially more reliable and can also detect positive states (Kremer et al. 2020).  70 
An increasingly used indicator of emotional states in non-human animals is cognitive bias 71 
(Paul et al. 2005). This indicator has its background in psychological experiments on humans; 72 
emotional states affect our memory, attention, and judgment (Mathews et al. 1995; Mineka 73 
and Sutton, 1992). A paradigmatic example of such influences is that people in negative 74 
emotional states, like anxiety, depression, or fear, tend to remember and focus on negative 75 
events and interpret ambiguous situations negatively. 76 
The potential utility of testing cognitive bias in welfare research was demonstrated in the 77 
seminal study of Harding et al., who showed that rats housed in “unpredictable”/stressful 78 
conditions (which cause depression-like symptoms) were inclined to respond more negatively 79 
to ambiguous situations than rats housed in “predictable”/familiar conditions. Their judgment 80 
was biased (Harding et al. 2004).1 The authors suggested using behavioral responses in 81 
ambiguous situations as an indicator of emotional states (Harding et al. 2004; Paul et al. 82 
2005), which initiated numerous studies that demonstrated that cognitive judgment bias can 83 
be found in a wide range of taxa, from pigs to bumblebees (reviewed in Lagisz et al. 2020; 84 
Mendl et al. 2009; Neville et al. 2020). Since both pharmacological and environmental 85 
manipulations of affective states alter judgment bias (reviewed in Lagisz et al. 2020; Neville 86 
et al. 2020), cognitive judgment bias tests can be considered as a promising tool for assessing 87 
emotional states of non-human animals. 88 
In this paper we pursue two main goals. First, we want to examine the epistemic role of 89 
judgment bias as an indicator of emotions. We start by pointing at known epistemic problems 90 
with the more traditional indicators of emotional states (behavioral and physiological 91 
changes) and point at some advantages as well as limits of using judgment bias as an indicator 92 
of emotional states in animals. We aim at assessing the epistemic value of the judgment bias 93 
test and demonstrate its empirical motivation. 94 
Second, we scrutinize judgment bias as such. What kind of cognitive abilities are in play? 95 
We are not engaging, however, in a conceptual analysis of the notion of judgment bias, but 96 
rather looking at cognitive abilities underlying the judgment bias that is used as an indicator 97 
of emotional states, and aiming at determining what kind of abilities these are. Animal 98 
welfare science might not need to determine exactly what kind of ability is used as an 99 
indicator as long as there are proper ways of tracking or individuating the emotional states. 100 
                                                 
1
 What exactly the housing conditions were and what it meant by responding “more negatively to ambiguous 
situations” will be clarified and discussed in section 2. 
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From other perspectives, however, this question is worth pursuing, because (1) for cognitive 101 
science and philosophy of mind, the (exact) kind of cognitive abilities of non-human animals 102 
is germane to understanding language acquisition and the evolution of higher cognitive 103 
abilities. (2) Pinpointing underlying cognitive abilities in different species might clarify 104 
minimal requirements for cognitive and emotion-like systems to produce such a phenomenon. 105 
(3) Even from the perspective of animal welfare studies, there are disparities between 106 
treatments of animals with higher and lower cognitive abilities. Therefore, it might be 107 
important to determine which level of cognitive abilities is in play in cases of judgment bias. 108 
This is important because evidence of judgment bias across the animal kingdom has fueled a 109 
heated debate on attributing emotional states and consciousness to species that are usually not 110 
considered being sentient (Mendl and Paul 2016) – a debate that has ramifications for 111 
questions concerning animal welfare and animal rights. 112 
 113 
2 Epistemic limits of emotional indicators 114 
Most scientists seem to agree that at least some emotional states can be ascribed to (some) 115 
non-human animals (Scarantino and Sousa 2021). However, in affective science there are not 116 
only many different theories on what constitutes emotions, but also the terminology is 117 
inconsistent, which can create misunderstandings when discussing emotions in non-human 118 
animals (see e.g., Adolphs and Andler 2018; Barrett et al. 2007; Izard 2010; LeDoux 2012; 119 
Paul and Mendl 2018). Therefore, before discussing the limitations of emotional indicators, 120 
we need to clarify the terminology. In this paper, we use the term “emotional state” broadly, 121 
referring to inner representational states without presupposing subjective or conscious 122 
experience. Concerning the structure of emotional states, we try to generalize across both, 123 
discrete approaches – considering basic emotions as discrete entities, underlayed by separate 124 
neurological systems (see Ekman 1992) – and dimensional approaches – specifying emotions 125 
by the position in multidimensional space, with two common dimensions being valance (i.e., 126 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of emotional state) and arousal (i.e., activity or energy level) 127 
(see Russell and Barrett 1999). 128 
Since emotions are not directly observable, assessing emotional states requires the use of 129 
indicators. There are two major types of problems with emotional indicators like behavioral 130 
and physiological changes. First, they are not unique to a specific emotional state. In other 131 
words, two or more different emotional states could be accompanied by the same/similar 132 
physiological and behavioral changes. This means that the indicators are not always indicators 133 
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of uniquely one emotional state (e.g., fear) or emotional dimension (e.g., unpleasant). This is 134 
problematic in biomedical and animal welfare research when trying to assess whether an 135 
animal is in a specific emotional state. For example, detection of an elevated level of 136 
circulating glucocorticoids as compared to the baseline could indicate that the animal is in a 137 
negative state (e.g., fear), but the same effect would be observed if the animal is aroused 138 
positively and thus, in a positive state (e.g., reward anticipation). Without appropriate context, 139 
the elevated glucocorticoid level thus turns out to be an indicator for emotional arousal in 140 
general rather than indicating a negative state (Ralph and Tilbrook 2016). Play behavior, to 141 
take another example, is generally considered a good indicator of positive emotional states, 142 
but in some cases, increased playing activity was connected with a negative emotional state of 143 
the tested animal as assessed by an independent method (Ahloy-Dallaire et al. 2018; Richter 144 
et al. 2016). Consequently, even commonly used indicators can fail to indicate the emotional 145 
state correctly when considered alone or taken out of biological context. Let us call this type 146 
of problem the specificity problem of emotional indicators. 147 
The second type of problem concerns the reliability of the emotional indicators as 148 
indicators. The observed physiological and behavioral changes are not exclusively caused by 149 
emotional states. A specific change in the behavior or physiological state of an animal could 150 
be caused by, for example, an adaptive coping mechanism that does not involve any 151 
emotional states. Moreover, certain stereotypic behaviors are unreliable indicators of 152 
emotional state. It has been shown that they could be a direct way to cope with a stressor (e.g., 153 
poor housing conditions) directly by “do-it-yourself-enriching” the environment or by 154 
calming themselves and thus, blocking stress, rather than coping with the condition indirectly 155 
via first eliciting another emotional state that then lowers stress (Mason and Latham 2004). 156 
Let us call this type of problem the reliability problem of emotional indicators.  157 
One way to overcome these epistemic difficulties is to look for new ways of assessing 158 
animal emotional states that are: (1) more emotion-specific; (2) more reliable; or (3) give rise 159 
to more reliable and/or emotion-specific indicators in combination with already existing 160 
indicators. A relatively new and popular emotional indicator that is assumed to overcome 161 
these problems is judgment bias. Before scrutinizing the explanatory power of judgment bias 162 
experiments, let us see how exactly these experiments are set up. 163 
Cognitive judgment bias test. Judgment bias experiments were, among other things, designed 164 
to show that decision-making and judgment in non-human animals are influenced by 165 
emotional states. The design of a judgment bias test can be generalized as follows. Animals 166 
are first trained to respond differently to two distinct cues of the same perceptual dimension 167 
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(e.g., visual, auditory, or spatial cues): they learn to respond to a “positive” training cue to 168 
obtain a reward (e.g., lever press for a high-pitched tone), and to respond in another way to a 169 
“negative” training cue to avert punishment (e.g., no lever press for a low-pitched tone).2 This 170 
is the training phase. When the animals have learned to respond correctly to training cues, 171 
they proceed to the test where they are presented with “ambiguous” cues, which are 172 
interspersed between training cues – this is the testing phase. Ambiguous cues are located 173 
qualitatively between the training cues associated with negative and positive effects – hence 174 
ambiguous – and are usually not rewarded. The behavioral response to ambiguous cues is 175 
considered to indicate whether the animal “anticipates” positive outcomes (responding as 176 
expecting reward) or negative outcomes (responding as avoiding punishment). These 177 
responses are shown to be sensitive to a change in emotional state (Lagisz et al. 2020; Neville 178 
et al. 2020) and they could be used as indicators of emotional states.  179 
For interpreting the observational data, it is required to know in which emotional state the 180 
animals are when responding to the ambiguous cues. Therefore, they are manipulated in a 181 
(emotionally) priming phase to be in a certain emotional state before being tested (in the 182 
testing phase). A typical setting divides animals into two groups. One group is manipulated by 183 
a treatment considered to induce a negative emotional state. The other serves as the control 184 
group and stays unmanipulated. Priming could be an unpredictable housing, lasting 185 
throughout the training and testing phase of the experiment, or an enforced electrical shock 186 
applied just before the testing phase. Similarly, positive treatment can be used as priming 187 
(e.g., providing enrichment). 188 
We could observe the following outcomes of such a judgment bias experiment: 189 
1. The animals from the “negatively” primed group might show a negative judgment bias by 190 
responding more often in the negative way with respect to the ambiguous cues, i.e., by the 191 
behavior they have learned to avoid punishment, than animals from the control group. The 192 
interpretation of this result would be that animals from the “negatively” primed group are 193 
in a negative emotional state and thus, that this particular priming is inducing a negative 194 
emotional state. The same goes for positive treatment.  195 
2. Priming might also not lead to any change in the interpretation of the ambiguous cue, so 196 
that there is no statistically significant difference between the treatment and the control 197 
group. This might mean that the priming did not evoke any emotional state that lasts until 198 
                                                 
2
 The association of a specific cue (e.g., tone pitch) with reward or punishment is usually counterbalanced. Also, 
there are test designs based on so-called go/go tasks where animals always need to respond to both “positive” 
and “negative” cues, which removes the confounding effect of motivation to respond. 
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the judgment bias test, or that the bias is too small to be detectable with a concrete 199 
experimental setting. However, as long as data from different individuals are averaged, it 200 
might also be the case that individuals react to the same treatment with different emotions, 201 
some with positive ones and others with negative ones.  202 
 203 
Let us now come back to the epistemic problems with emotional indicators. It seems quite 204 
obvious that the judgment bias test inherits the reliability problem. The described experiments 205 
may show that there is a correlation between a treatment, expected to induce certain emotional 206 
states, and behavioral responses in a judgment bias test (as described in outcome 1). However, 207 
different factors, besides the emotional state, can influence judgment bias (Whittaker and 208 
Barker 2020). Consequently, if it is possible and plausible that cases of judgment bias could 209 
occur without any involvement of emotional states, then judgment bias has the same 210 
reliability problem as other indicators. This, of course, does not mean that the overall 211 
reliability could not be increased if we took additional indicators into account. The point is 212 
rather that if we look at each emotional indicator (including judgment bias) separately and try 213 
to assess the emotional states by it, then the reliability problem remains unsolved.  214 
At first glance, it seems that the specificity problem, too, accompanies judgment bias as an 215 
emotional indicator. It is hard to imagine that one could be able to specify the exact kind of 216 
emotional state of an animal (fear, anger, depression-like states, joy, frustration, etc.) just 217 
from the judgment bias, be it negative or positive. However, the experiments seem to suggest 218 
that there are correlations between negative bias and negative emotional states in general and 219 
between positive bias and positive emotional states in general (Lagisz et al. 2020). This is 220 
certainly a relevant differentiation and might, in many cases, even be sufficient from the 221 
particular perspective of animal welfare scientists, because, as mentioned before, their interest 222 
often is assessing whether or not animals are in negative (or positive) emotional states. So 223 
while, for example, an elevated level of circulating glucocorticoids could be indicating either 224 
a state of fear or one of excitement and thus, does not allow to infer a negative or a positive 225 
emotional state, a state of fear would usually correlate with a negative judgment bias and a 226 
state of excitement with a positive one. In this respect, judgment bias promises to be more 227 
specific than some other indicators. 228 
To sum up, in light of inherent epistemic problems of traditional emotional indicators, 229 
there are at least two reasons to consider judgment bias tests as an alternative: (1) Where 230 
emotional indicators have different degrees of reliability, having another indicator in addition 231 
to the already existing ones can increase the overall reliability of these indicators when all are 232 
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pointing to the same emotional state; (2) With a cognitive bias test, it seems possible to assess 233 
whether a certain treatment induces a positive or negative emotional state, which is of eminent 234 
value for animal welfare science and biomedical science. 235 
Having discussed some inherent problems with emotional indicators and established the 236 
epistemic motivation of judgment bias tests, let us now discuss the underlying cognitive 237 
mechanism. 238 
 239 
3 Underlying cognitive abilities 240 
We are now going to scrutinize cognitive abilities that could underline and explain behavioral 241 
responses to ambiguous situations in judgment bias tests. However, before introducing 242 
possible candidates, let us first specify the category of cognitive abilities. With this category 243 
we are referring to mental capacities, like the abilities to represent, to have emotions, to 244 
perceive, to judge, and other higher level mental capacities. These are to be discerned from 245 
the neuronal activities and processes that form the basis of these capacities. Such more 246 
fundamental processes cannot as such explain animal activities and behaviors in judgment 247 
bias tests; the concept of judgment bias focuses on representational states rather than on their 248 
neuronal basis. This can be seen in both “folk psychology” and empirical sciences. Consider, 249 
for example, answers to questions like: “Why is that squirrel climbing that tree so fast? Why 250 
is that honeybee flying in that direction?” The answers would usually refer to representational 251 
states or abilities rather than to – unknown – neural states: because the squirrel is scared of 252 
and running away from the dog (representing it as dangerous) or because the honeybee 253 
represents the nectar to be in that direction, say, as a result of observing the dance of a fellow 254 
bee and interpreting it as representing the nectar occurrence in that direction. Analogically, 255 
the answer to the question of why the animals in the cognitive bias tests respond to the 256 
ambiguous cue in a specific way would refer to some kinds of emotional or inner 257 
representational states or ability. That is why ascertaining possible representational abilities 258 
that can result in the behaviors in question has immense explanatory value for scientists 259 
conducting cognitive bias tests.  260 
A last remark before our analysis of the underlying mechanisms; this is not an analysis of 261 
the terms “ambiguous,” “bias,” or “judgment” or of their applications. Our listed candidates 262 
of inner states and abilities that explain the reaction to the ambiguous cue in the judgment bias 263 
tests may or may not confirm the usage of these terms – whatever the criteria of this 264 
confirmation might be. Nevertheless, our focus is not on this kind of conformation but on 265 
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plausible candidates for different cognitive abilities that would result in similar behavioral 266 
outputs with similar input conditions in these tests.  267 
3.1 Plausible candidates 268 
Scientists experimenting on judgment bias often do not ask the question about the (exact) kind 269 
of cognitive abilities that bring the bias about. They are very cautious in classifying the 270 
responses as merely being “as if” the animal expected a certain outcome (Mendl et al. 2009; 271 
Paul et al. 2005; Roelofs et al. 2016). Usually, they treat the involved cognitive mechanism as 272 
a black box and track it through its behavioral outputs.3 As clarified before, we think that this 273 
question is worth answering from both perspectives, that of cognitive science and that of 274 
animal welfare science, as it could lead to refined measurements, development of new tests, 275 
and better understanding of emotional states in general. 276 
Our approach to answer the above question is to make a list of cognitive abilities that are 277 
discussed in philosophy of cognition and that we, at the same time, consider as being 278 
evolutionary plausible candidates that might produce the biased output in a systematic or 279 
regular way. This will outline some of the possible and plausible underlying abilities that 280 
contribute to the mechanism in the assumed black box. The answer would in part require 281 
describing some inner states of the animals as representing the external cues, i.e., assuming 282 
that the states are directed at, or are about an external phenomenon or state of affairs (e.g., 283 
Sterelny 1990). 284 
1. Constitutive lack of discrimination. It is plausible that the cognitive system of some 285 
animals does not discriminate between the cue that, from our perspective, should be 286 
ambiguous for them, and one of the training cues. This inability might be a “constitutive” lack 287 
of discrimination between ambiguous and training cue, and would not be mediated or altered 288 
by emotional states and other conditions, for it is a matter of physiology and unmodifiable by 289 
priming. Imagine, for example, somebody who suffers from a particular kind of color 290 
blindness and cannot discriminate between, say, blue and purple but can distinguish red. This 291 
person now receives a purple cue, meant by the experimenter as a middle cue between blue 292 
and red and, and sees it as blue. The test person’s perceptual apparatus simply does not 293 
discriminate between what we would classify as a middle cue and as one of the others. Now 294 
                                                 
3
 Mendl et al. (2009) sketched a picture of what they hypothesized as underlying mechanisms of judgment bias 
which we will in part discuss in this section. However, they admitted that this might not concern animal welfare 
studies in practice: “From a practical animal welfare perspective it is perhaps not necessary to understand the 
processes underlying judgment biases” (ibid. 172). 
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imagine that this is the “normal” case for the whole species that is being experimented on; the 295 
cue would not be ambiguous for individuals belonging to this species. 296 
This possibility is eliminated if animals show the ability to discriminate between the cues 297 
in a separate experiment or if animals respond differently to ambiguous cues than to the 298 
training cues in the judgment bias test. This seems to be the case in most published studies 299 
since different responses to at least some ambiguous cues are considered a prerequisite for a 300 
valid judgment bias test (Gygax 2014, 61). We are mentioning this case for reasons of 301 
completeness, and also because it helps to better understand the other candidates. 302 
2. Misrepresentation. One of the most plausible situations that might hold is that the 303 
ambiguous cue is represented – wrongly – as one of the cues the animal was trained upon, i.e., 304 
that it is misrepresented (Dretske 1986; Godfrey-Smith 1989). Assume the cues trained upon 305 
were squares and circles, and the ambiguous cue being an octagon. If the content of the 306 
representation is an octagon (however, one could possibly find this out), the ambiguous cue 307 
would be represented correctly. If the ambiguous cue is represented either as a circle or as a 308 
square, or in the very way a circle or a square is represented, it is misrepresented. Or consider 309 
the following standard example of a misrepresentation (Agar 1993): a frog misrepresents a 310 
certain black particle, let us say a small black piece of paper, in the air as, say, a nutritious 311 
flying prey, and the prey-capture mechanism of the frog triggers a tongue-dart in the 312 
appropriate direction and captures the piece of paper. This could happen for various reasons; 313 
the black piece of paper looks just too much like a fly or the frog is just too hungry etc. The 314 
point is that the piece of paper is not represented as a piece of paper (which would be 315 
impossible as long as we assume that this category does not exist at all for the frog), and that 316 
it is also not the case that it is not represented at all. It is represented as something else with 317 
which the frog is familiar, in this case as a fly. It is likely that something similar is happening 318 
in judgment bias experiments when an animal observes an ambiguous cue; the cue is 319 
misrepresented as a “familiar one.”  320 
Mendl et al. mention that something like this might be the case with ambiguous cues that 321 
are very similar to training cues but argue that this is likely not to be the case when 322 
ambiguous cues can be easily distinguished from training cues (Mendl et al. 2009, 172). So, to 323 
exclude misrepresentation, does one simply need to confirm that animals can discriminate 324 
between ambiguous and training cues in classical discrimination experiments where two cues 325 
are presented simultaneously? This would be too quick a conclusion. Consider the following: 326 
just because one is able to distinguish between cats and dogs under ideal or standard 327 
conditions, it does not mean that one is not likely to confuse them under certain circumstances 328 
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or in certain contexts, e.g., to mistake in dim light a small dog for a cat. Similarly, just 329 
because animals showed the ability to discriminate between the ambiguous cues and the 330 
training cues, they need not be able to do so under testing conditions of judgment bias 331 
experiments, where multiple ambiguous and training cues are presented sequentially with 332 
time gaps in-between (as mentioned by Mendl et al. 2009, 173). They might still misrepresent 333 
ambiguous cues as one of the training cues. Misrepresentation can occur for various reasons. 334 
The reward is just too delicious, or at least delicious enough to mistake anything resembling 335 
the positive cue as being the positive cue; or the punishment is too severe or severe enough so 336 
that anything resembling the negative cue gets mistaken as being the negative cue; or the 337 
emotional inducing phase made the test animals too cautious, too afraid, too anxious, too 338 
bored etc. 339 
As an argument for a more advanced cognitive ability, Mendl et al. use the observations 340 
that there is a gradual change in response to cues in judgment bias tests (Mendl et al. 2009, 341 
173). In a typical judgment bias test, animals are often introduced to three ambiguous cues; 342 
one ambiguous cue is closer to the positive (near-positive), one is closer to the negative 343 
training cue (near-negative), and one is perceptually in the middle. This scheme is applied to 344 
test whether there is a gradual change in animals’ responses across the cues. For example, 345 
animals reduce lever pressing from the positive cue via ambiguous cues to the negative cue, 346 
thus producing a monotonic response curve. If there is a gradual change in responses, it is 347 
presumed as validating that animals interpret ambiguous cues in reference to the trained cues 348 
(e.g., Gygax 2014, 61; Hintze et al. 2018, 10). Assuming that the middle ambiguous cue is not 349 
perceived as actually being one or the other of the training cues, Mendl et al. consider that it is 350 
likely that something cognitively more advanced like decision-making is happening. Although 351 
we grant that something like this might be happening in animals with higher cognitive 352 
abilities, which we will consider next, we want to emphasize misrepresentation as being one 353 
of the most likely scenarios, even in cases where one might consider decision-making as 354 
being an alternative mechanism. To be clear, our estimation of likelihood here is not based on 355 
empirical data but rather on the principle of Ockham’s razor to be as scarce as possible with 356 
assuming entities, in this case with presupposing involved cognitive instances or abilities. In 357 
fact, if it is likely that the animals are misrepresenting the ambiguous near-positive and near-358 
negative cues, we do not need to – and should not – bring some higher cognitive abilities, like 359 
decision-making, into play to explain the response to the middle ambiguous cue as long as 360 
there is no concrete indication for involvement of the higher capacity. In the case mentioned, 361 
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there is no such independent argument for the presumption that the animals’ gradual 362 
responses indicate decision-making. 363 
 Nevertheless, because it is possible that more advanced cognitive abilities would produce 364 
the similar output under the similar input conditions (as in the case of humans), we will still 365 
consider this option and try to identify the minimal requirements of such a cognitive system 366 
according to an evolutionary perspective.  367 
3. Conflicting content(s). The third possibility which could be available in an advanced 368 
cognitive system is the representation of the ambiguous cues as ambiguous, for example, as 369 
something undetermined between two or more specific states or objects. To have an analogy 370 
from the perspective of a (human) viewer, it is not like: “I am seeing something but I don’t 371 
have any idea what it is,” but more like “I am seeing something that is either x or y, but I 372 
cannot exactly tell which one of those two.” The latter is analogous to the cases that we are 373 
considering now.  374 
It is important to note that the conflicting content(s) could be different contents of 375 
different representations of the same state of affairs, or a “conflicting” content of a single 376 
representation of that state of affairs. Without going too deep into the theories of content, with 377 
a conflicting content of one representation we are referring to a content that has two or more 378 
aspects with different psychological roles (hence “conflicting”), e.g., a state of affairs is 379 
represented as being a dog or a cat or even as a dog or a non-dog, where there are different 380 
behaviors associated with these different aspects, for example fleeing in case of the 381 
representation of a dog and attacking in case of a cat or a non-dog. How exactly these aspects 382 
are represented and how the connections between them appear is not relevant here. It is 383 
merely relevant that the cognitive system links these different aspects to different behavioral 384 
outputs4 and that the cognitive system has the means to deal with this conflict.  385 
While it might sound natural that humans have such representations, the issue is much 386 
more complex than it appears at first glance. In general, the state of affairs in question needs 387 
to be represented as conflicting (either through the conflicting representations or the 388 
conflicting aspects of a representation of the state of affairs), which furthermore means that 389 
there are mechanisms, over and above “regular” representational mechanisms, that evaluate 390 
these representations and compute, or “decide” about,5 the generation of an output signal that 391 
enters the behavior-producing mechanisms. This feat of the cognitive system is a capacity 392 
                                                 
4
 “Behavioral output” is to be understood in a broad sense and does not need to be a behavior of the animal in the 
strict sense. It includes, for instance, activities of some subsystems that are triggered by the representation(s).  
5
 We assume “computing/‘decision-making’” as not necessarily being a conscious process.  
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over and above the ability to represent (and misrepresent) something in a specific way, 393 
because simple representational systems do not usually evaluate representations or aspects of 394 
a representation against each other. 395 
We want to emphasize that we are not suggesting that there is no evaluation of 396 
representations or some kind of computing happening in cases of mere misrepresentations. 397 
However, if the animal has a representation with a conflicting content or competing 398 
representations, then some kind of resolving-mechanisms should come into play that deal with 399 
the ambiguity. Doing this in a consistent way requires the involvement of a different, more 400 
advanced cognitive ability than would be required in reacting to a mere misrepresentation of a 401 
cue. Bear in mind that from the setup of the judgment bias experiments there is not yet much 402 
known that allows us to assess which kind of these cognitive abilities (misrepresentation 403 
versus conflicting contents) is in play. Our analysis suggests a way of gaining better 404 
knowledge about the representational systems, i.e., a way to open the black box at least a little 405 
bit; does the animal always react the same way to an ambiguous cue, or does it learn to 406 
distinguish it from the training cues? One might expect that conflicting content is interpreted 407 
cautiously or with hesitation on the first confrontation, but more decisively in later ones, 408 
while a plain misrepresentation would not give rise to any hesitation.  409 
A judgment bias test, however, would merely hint at certain mechanisms and cannot be 410 
used to conclusively distinguish between cases of misrepresentation and of conflicting 411 
contents. We will therefore discuss, in section 3.2, more complex experimental setups that 412 
could yield more definite results on the representation mechanism involved. 413 
4. Novel representation. The last option that we want to consider is the possibility of 414 
having a novel representation, i.e., to represent the state of affairs – the ambiguous cue – as 415 
novel. To use the analogy from before, it is more like: “I am seeing something but I don’t 416 
know what exactly it is.” 417 
Representing something as novel does not mean that the representation is marked by a 418 
“novel”-index. It also does not mean that the one having the representation “thinks” the 419 
content is novel (conscious or not). All it means in this context is that the one having the 420 
representation has not yet gathered any prior information about what is being represented, 421 
which includes in particular that it does not relate the novel representation as being related to 422 
the training cues. One of the most central feats of the cognitive system is to use information 423 
gathered in prior encounters with an entity in the current or future encounters with that entity 424 
(Millikan 2000). It is therefore common for the cognitive system to start tracking and 425 
gathering information about newly encountered unknown entities.  426 
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Representing ambiguous cues as novel is more likely in certain types of judgment bias 427 
tests. The most prominent case is when the cues do not differ in only one perceptual 428 
dimension (e.g., Douglas et al. 2012; Nogueira et al. 2015; Salmeto et al. 2011). For example, 429 
Douglas et al. (2012) used different acoustic sounds: a note on a glockenspiel and a dog-430 
training clicker as training cues, and a squeak from a dog toy as the cue which was considered 431 
to be ambiguous. However, do animals perceive these sounds to be different in frequency, in 432 
noise level, or in some other dimension? In such cases, it is not clear how animals relate 433 
ambiguous cues to training cues; they could be represented as novel (as mentioned by Roelofs 434 
et al. 2016). Although for a different reason, novelty could also play a role in judgment bias 435 
tests that are based on spatial cues. In this type of tests, ambiguous cues are represented by a 436 
novel location which is in-between the trained cues (e.g., Briefer and McElligott 2013; 437 
Richter et al. 2012). Jardim et al. showed that in this design, reaction to the ambiguous 438 
situation depends on how explorative an individual is and thus, includes the animal’s response 439 
to novelty (Jardim et al. 2021). It is thus possible that animals represent situations that are 440 
intended to be ambiguous as novel, at least in some judgment bias tests. 441 
The behavioral output in such cases would depend on various factors, such as the level of 442 
individual development of the cognitive system, the individual’s prior learning experiences, 443 
the overall cognitive capacities of the species, the organism’s predispositions, and of course 444 
the organism’s present environment and emotional state. However, if the organism had a 445 
genuinely novel representation, it could be expected that it would change its behavior 446 
depending on the kinds of information being gathered about the entities in question (here, the 447 
ambiguous cue). For example, if the ambiguous cues are not associated with any reward or 448 
punishment and the animal starts to ignore these cues pretty quickly, it would suggest that (at 449 
some point) the animal has had a novel representation of the ambiguous cue and that the 450 
representation has a different content than the representations of the previously learned ones. 451 
This so-called “loss of ambiguity” is observed in many studies (reviewed in Roelofs et al. 452 
2016). 453 
Before describing our suggestion about (practical) ways of differentiating these options, 454 
let us make some important clarifications. Firstly, we do not suggest that our list of possible 455 
candidates for mechanisms is complete. This is the list of options that we think are the most 456 
plausible candidates for the underlying cognitive abilities. Others might be possible. Secondly 457 
and most importantly, we do not think that these possibilities are mutually exclusive. In other 458 
words, it is possible that the underlying cognitive ability of a process studied is a complex 459 
combination of these options. For example, an animal could misrepresent the ambiguous cue 460 
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at first but start perceiving it as novel later and change/adjust its behavior accordingly; or the 461 
animal could perceive the cue as novel but misrepresent some aspects of it as being dangerous 462 
or advantageous and so on. This means that assessing the exact configuration of the 463 
underlying cognitive mechanisms through experiments requires thorough planning, more 464 
complex training phases (we will address this in the next section), and various controlling 465 
scenarios, which taken together might be near impossible to conduct for some species. 466 
Nevertheless, in the next section, we will suggest a setting that is less likely to involve 467 
misrepresentation. 468 
3.2 Ways of differentiating: A new proposal 469 
As we stated earlier, the possibility that the tested animals might lack the ability to 470 
discriminate between the ambiguous cues and the cues in the training phase can be eliminated 471 
through separate experiments that test their perceptual abilities. However, things are more 472 
complicated if we are to establish whether a behavioral output of the judgment bias test is the 473 
result of a misrepresentation, of conflicting contents, or an instance of novel representation. 474 
As a promising way that is less likely to involve misrepresentation than conflicting 475 
contents or novel representations, we propose using a setting that involves two pairs of cues 476 
during both training and testing phases.6 In the training phase, animals need to learn 477 
associating two different cues7 with negative and two with positive outcomes. In the testing 478 
phase, rather than using novel cues that are supposed to be ambiguous, the properly 479 
conditioned animals are exposed only to cues they are already familiar with, namely to a 480 
combination of one cue that is associated with a negative outcome and simultaneously to 481 
another one associated with a positive outcome. In this kind of experiment, a conflicting input 482 
is realized by combining the positive cue of one of the pairs with the negative cue of the other 483 
at the same time. Therefore, in contrast to a judgment bias test, the “ambiguity” is represented 484 
not by one ambiguous cue, but rather by two different, conflicting cues. Each of the cues is 485 
unambiguous and might even address different sensory modes (e.g., visual and auditory).8 It is 486 
important to test both options of “ambiguous combinations” of cues, a positive cue 1 with a 487 
negative cue 2 and a negative cue 1 with a positive cue 2. This rules out that one of the cues 488 
might generally override the other. Individuals would need to provide relatively consistent 489 
                                                 
6
 This setting has been used in Parker (2008) for a different purpose than we are proposing here. 
7
 Optimally, both senses should have similar perceptual values for the animals to avoid the possibility that the 
behavioral outcome is the result of the animals being overly sensitive to one cue rather than the other. 
8
 Of course there should be several control groups with negative-negative, positive-positive, and negative-
positive with a different timely distance between the sensorially different cues.  
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answers to both “ambiguous combinations” for the experiment to be valid, i.e., ascribing 490 
ability to solve conflicting content. Completely random answers of the individual would 491 
suggest a lack of relevant problem solving mechanisms. 492 
This experiment is not supposed to be an improvement upon the judgment bias test. The 493 
suggested setup serves the purpose of singling out specific mechanisms underlying the 494 
judgment bias, in the case of scientific interest in doing so. This setup is primarily supposed to 495 
test whether animals possess certain conflict-solving mechanisms. However, it does not 496 
necessarily exclude a novel representation of the presented conflict. 497 
 498 
Possible outcomes. In the following, we discuss the possible outcomes of such an 499 
experiment and show which conclusions could be drawn with respect to how the underlying 500 
cognitive system represents the cues: 501 
The individuals are trained to the cues and then exposed to ambiguous combinations of 502 
cues, without any prior exposition to emotion-eliciting conditions. Let us assume that the 503 
punishment and rewards in the experiment are “fair,” i.e., they are not too highly evaluated by 504 
the animals.9 505 
A.   Each individual might show a consistently biased answer, positively in some 506 
individuals and negatively in others. This would allow ascription of a dispositional trait 507 
to the individuals that count as long-lasting. We could call these individuals “optimistic” 508 
or “pessimistic” decision-makers. 509 
B. All individuals might show a similar bias, either positive or negative. One could interpret 510 
this as constitutive optimism or pessimism being a certain dispositional trait of the 511 
species under investigation, where either a positive or a negative cue overrides an 512 
opposing cue. Existence of such “optimistic” or “pessimistic” species traits might be 513 
expected if they were selected for due to certain living conditions.10 514 
C. The answer might be found to be arbitrary in all individuals, i.e., the ambiguous 515 
combination of cues leads to positive and negative answers in statistically indiscernible 516 
proportions in each individual. The conflicting contents, which in isolation lead to a 517 
positive and negative answer, respectively, level out. This outcome would strongly 518 
suggest that the animals do not possess the relevant problem solving mechanisms at the 519 
                                                 
9
 Finding out whether or not the reward and punishment are evaluated “fairly” by the animals would involve 
prior experience and experiments which might differ from species to species.  
10
 The same outcome would be expectable if the punishment or reward are evaluated too highly by the animals. 
However, this option should be excluded by proper test design, so the explanation of this outcome would (most 
likely) refer to natural selection.  
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cognitive level11 for this kind of situation. It does not rule out that a modified or refined 520 
experiment might indicate the presence of other problem solving mechanisms, e.g., one 521 
using different cues or cues of different intensity. 522 
 523 
Notice that if the proposed setting would result in something like (A) and the same kind of 524 
animal, i.e., another individual of the same species, or, e.g., of the same cast, social status, or 525 
developmental stage, would also show judgment bias in the judgment bias test, that would 526 
still not mean that the animals do not misrepresent the ambiguous cue in the judgment bias 527 
test. It would, however, imply that for this kind of animal it is possible not to misrepresent the 528 
ambiguous cue and to represent it as conflicting. On the other hand, if the result would be 529 
something like (C) but the same kind of animals would show judgment bias in the judgment 530 
bias test, then this would strongly suggest that the animals in the judgment bias test are 531 
misrepresenting the ambiguous cue. The reverse, however, does not hold. If the animals are 532 
misrepresenting the ambiguous cue in the judgment bias test, it would not necessarily mean, 533 
in our setting, that they do not possess the relevant problem solving mechanisms.  534 
 535 
4 Conclusion 536 
Judgment bias tests allow assessing emotional states of non-human animals. Central to these 537 
tests is confronting animals with ambiguous cues that are intermediates between cues they 538 
have learned to link to positive and negative consequences, respectively, and to act 539 
accordingly. The mechanism of decision-making is usually taken to be a black box. We 540 
discussed how this black box could be opened, at least a little bit, even by experiments of the 541 
considered type. Drawing on the philosophical perspective of understanding decision-making 542 
as a capacity of certain representational systems, we determined three different ways that 543 
ambiguous stimuli could in principle be represented: misrepresentation, conflicting content, 544 
and novel representation. We judge misrepresentation to be the most likely scenario. 545 
Misrepresentation, however, does not imply the involvement of higher cognitive abilities that 546 
evaluate representations against each other. We propose a test regime in which the ambiguous 547 
stimulus is replaced by an ambiguous pair of unambiguous stimuli. This test regime makes it 548 
less likely that the animals misrepresent the ambiguous situation and aims primarily at testing 549 
the involvement of certain problem solving mechanisms that resolve a representation with a 550 
conflicting content. Finding out which species have this kind of mechanism would not only be 551 
                                                 
11
 There still might be mechanisms merely at the neuronal level to prevent “cognitive-freezing” and to cause the 
animals to get past the situation. 
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an interesting result in itself, but also help better understand the mechanism of biased 552 
judgment in non-human animals, which could help further develop judgment bias tests. 553 
 554 
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